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Separating	   Normalcy	   from	   Emergency:	   The	   Jurisprudence	   of	  
Article	  15	  of	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  
	  






The	   European	   Convention	   of	  Human	  Rights1	   (ECHR)	   is	   as	  much	   a	   political	   as	   it	   is	   a	   legal	  
document.	   The	   European	   Court	   of	   Human	   Rights	   (ECtHR)	   constantly	   walks	   the	   delicate	  
tight	  rope	  between	  vindicating	  human	  rights	  and	  respecting	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  contracting	  
states.2	   This	   balancing	   act	   is	   particularly	   sensitive	   when	   a	   situation	   of	   “exceptional	   and	  
imminent	  danger”3	  exists.	  In	  such	  instances	  of	  national	  security	  the	  state	  may	  need	  to	  act	  
in	   a	   manner	   beyond	   the	   parameters	   of	   normalcy	   in	   order	   to	   neutralize	   the	   threat	   and	  
protect	   both	   itself	   and	   its	   citizens.	   Article	   15	   of	   the	   ECHR	   therefore	   allows	   states	   to	  
derogate	  from	  its	  obligations	  under	  the	  convention	  when	  a	  state	  of	  emergency	  is	  declared.	  
On	   foot	   of	   a	   notice	   of	   derogation,	   a	   state	   has	   more	   discretion	   and	   flexibility	   to	   act	  
accordingly	  to	  respond	  to	  a	  threat	  without	  being	  constrained	  by	  its	  obligations	  under	  the	  
treaty.	   However,	   it	   is	   also	   in	   these	   conditions	   that	   human	   rights	   are	   at	   their	   most	  
vulnerable	   as	   the	   state’s	   response	  may	   encroach	   severely	   on	   individuals’	   rights	   and	   the	  
liberal-­‐democratic	  order	  of	  the	  state.	  
	  
On	  first	  reading,	  Article	  15	  appears	  to	  recognize	  that	  a	  dichotomy	  exists	  between	  normalcy	  
and	   emergency.	   This	   assumption	   is	   a	   fundamental	   aspect	   of	   what	   I	   shall	   call	   the	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1	  Convention	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Fundamental	  Freedoms	  (European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  
Rights,	   as	   amended	   by	   Protocols	   11	   and	   14,	   hereinafter	   “ECHR”),	   June	   2010,	   available	   at	  
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-­‐DC13-­‐4318-­‐B457-­‐5C9014916D7A/0/ENG_CONV.pdf	   (last	  
accessed	  29th	  September	  2011). 
2	  	  E.g.	  The	  “margin	  of	  appreciation”	  doctrine,	  for	  example,	  acts	  as	  a	  protector	  for	  state	  sovereignty.	  See	  Handyside	  
v.	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  Judgment	  of	  7	  December	  1976,	  24	  Eur.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  (ser.	  A,	  1976). 
3	   Nicole	   Questiaux,	   Study	   of	   the	   Implications	   for	   Human	   Rights	   of	   Recent	   Developments	   concerning	   situations	  
known	  as	  States	  of	  Siege	  or	  Emergency,	  UN	  Doc.	  E/CN4/2	  of	  27	  July	  1982. 
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“emergency	   paradigm.”	   However,	   it	   is	   this	   assumption	   that	   has	   come	   under	   scrutiny	   by	  
academics.4	   Events	   of	   the	   20th	   and	   early	   21st	   centuries,	   particularly	   the	   aftermath	   of	   11	  
September	   2001,5	   have	   led	   many	   to	   argue	   that	   it	   is	   no	   longer	   possible	   to	   separate	  
normalcy	   from	   emergency.6	   We	   are,	   because	   of	   this	   flawed	   paradigm,	   now	   stuck	   in	   a	  
“permanent	  state	  of	  emergency”7	  where	  so-­‐called	  temporary	  powers	  are	  perpetuated	  and	  
human	  rights	  encroached	  upon.	  As	  a	  result,	  some	  commentators	  have	  turned	  their	  back	  on	  
the	  emergency	  paradigm,	  to	  investigate	  alternative	  models	  of	  crisis	  accommodation,	  which	  
do	  not	  rely	  on	  this	  apparently	   flawed	  assumption	  of	  a	  separation	  between	  normalcy	  and	  
emergency.8	  These	  alternative	  models	  strive	  for	  an	  approach	  that	  vindicates	  and	  protects	  
human	  rights,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  allowing	  a	  state	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  threat	  accordingly.	  
	  
The	   aim	   of	   this	   article	   is	   to	   show	   that	   the	   application	   of	   Article	   15	   by	   the	   ECtHR	   is	   not	  
accurately	   described	   by	   the	   emergency	   paradigm,	   but	   instead	   contains	   elements	   that	  
correlate	  with	  those	  models	  of	  accommodation	  known	  as	  “monism”9	  or	  “business	  as	  usual	  
models;”10no	  distinction	  is	  made	  between	  normalcy	  and	  emergency.	  Rather	  the	  same	  rules	  
apply	  both	  during	  normalcy	  and	  emergency.11	  As	  a	   result,	   to	  argue	   that	  we	  are	  now	   in	  a	  
permanent	  state	  of	  emergency	  and	  that	  the	  emergency	  paradigm	  is	  obsolete	  is	  rash,	  as	  the	  
                                            
4	  See	  Mark	  Neocleous,	  The	  Problem	  with	  Normality:	  Taking	  Exception	  to	  “Permanent	  Emergency,”	  31	  ALTERNATIVES	  
191,	  195	  (2006).	  Neocleus	  undertakes	  a	  literature	  review	  in	  this	  area	  to	  conclude	  that	  “permanent	  emergency”	  is	  
now	  the	  dominant	  mantra	  of	  the	  left	  and	  indeed,	  of	  the	  libertarian	  right	  as	  well. 
5	  On	  11	  September	  2001,	  two	  hijacked	  airliners	  flew	  into	  the	  World	  Trade	  Centre	  Towers,	  New	  York	  destroying	  
them	  and	  killing	   thousands.	  A	   third	  plane	  crashed	   into	   the	  Pentagon	  Building,	  Washington.	  A	   final	  plane	  crash-­‐
landed	   in	   Pennsylvania,	   killing	   all	   on	   board.	   In	   total,	   2,753	   people	   lost	   their	   lives.	   See	   generally,	   National	  
Commission	   on	   Terrorist	   Attacks	   Upon	   the	   United	   States,	   The	   9/11	   Commission	   Report:	   Final	   Report	   of	   the	  
National	   Commission	   on	   Terrorist	   Attacks	   Upon	   the	   United	   States,	   available	   at	  
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/pdf/fullreport.pdf	  (last	  accessed	  29th	  September	  2011). 
6	  See	  Oren	  Gross,	  Chaos	  and	  Rules:	   Should	  Responses	   to	  Violent	  Crises	  always	  be	  Constitutional?,	  112	  YALE	   L.	   J.	  
1011,	  1089-­‐1095	  (2003). 
7	  See	  GIORGIO	  AGAMBEN,	  STATE	  OF	  EXCEPTION	  4	  (2005);	  see	  also	  Gross,	  id.	  at	  1089-­‐1094. 
8	  For	  examples	  of	  an	  extra-­‐legal/extra-­‐constitutional	  approach	  see	  Gross,	   id.	   at	  1096;	  Mark	  Tushnet,	  Defending	  
Korematsu?	  Reflections	  on	  Civil	  Liberties	   in	  Wartime,	  WISCONSIN	  LAW	  REVIEW	  273,	  304-­‐307	   (2003).	  See	  also	  Nomi	  
Claire	   Lazar’s	   rejection	  of	   the	   state	  of	  exception	  discourse	   in	  NOMI	  CLAIRE	   LAZAR,	   STATES	  OF	  EMERGENCIES	   IN	   LIBERAL	  
DEMOCRACIES	   (2009).	   Dyzenhaus	   argues	   that	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   expressly	   prohibits	   an	   exception,	   either	   within	   or	  
outside	  the	   legal	  order.	  See	  generally,	  DAVID	  DYZENHAUS,	  THE	  CONSTITUTION	  OF	  LAW:	  LEGALITY	   IN	  A	  TIME	  OF	  EMERGENCY	  
(2006). 
9	  See	  Ian	  Zuckerman,	  One	  Law	  for	  War	  and	  Peace?	  Judicial	  Review	  and	  Emergency	  Powers	  between	  the	  Norm	  and	  
the	  Exception,	  13	  CONSTELLATIONS	  522,	  524	  (2006). 
10	  See	  OREN	  GROSS	  &	  FIONNUALA	  NÍ	  AOLÁIN,	  LAW	  IN	  TIMES	  OF	  CRISIS:	  EMERGENCY	  POWERS	  IN	  THEORY	  AND	  PRACTICE	  Chap.	  2	  
(2006).	   
11	   As	   the	   US	   Supreme	   Court	   declared	   of	   the	   applicability	   of	   the	   US	   Constitution	   in	   a	   time	   of	   war	   in	   Ex	   Parte	  
Milligan,	  71	  U.S.	  (4	  Wall.)	  2,	  120-­‐21	  (1866). 
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emergency-­‐normalcy	   dichotomy	   has	   never	   been	   properly	   adhered	   to.	   The	   emergency	  
paradigm	   is	  still	   relevant	  today,	  both	  as	  a	  means	  to	  allow	  a	  state	  to	  defend	   itself,	  and	  to	  
protect	  human	   rights.	  Derogation	  clauses	  can	  accordingly	  be	  described	  as	  a	   sword	  and	  a	  
shield.	   As	   the	   former,	   they	   allow	   a	   state	   to	   breach	   civil	   rights	   and	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   that	  
ordinarily	  constrain	  them.	  Yet	  also,	  by	  outlining	  when	  such	  measures	  may	  be	  undertaken,	  
they	   shield	   and	   protect	   human	   rights	   in	   times	   when	   conditions	   do	   not	   equate	   to	   an	  
emergency.	  By	  arguing	  in	  favor	  of	  maintaining	  a	  clear	  demarcation	  between	  normalcy	  and	  
emergency,	  this	  article	  does	  so	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  human	  rights	  most	  effectively.	  	  
	  
This	   paper	   commences	   with	   a	   brief	   discussion	   of	   the	   emergency	   paradigm	   and	   the	  
fundamental	  assumptions	  that	  underlie	   it.	  This	  shall	  be	  compared	  and	  contrasted	  against	  
the	   “business	   as	   usual”	   model,	   which	   does	   not	   make	   the	   assumption	   of	   a	   separation	  
between	  normalcy	  and	  emergency.	  Building	  upon	   this	  background,	   I	   shall	   then	  present	  a	  
discussion	  of	  the	  text	  of	  Article	  15	  of	  the	  ECHR	  by	  isolating	  the	  “two	  limbs”	  it	  consists	  of:	  
that	   there	  must	  exist	  a	   threat	   to	   the	   life	  of	   that	  nation,	  and	   that	   the	  measures	   taken	  on	  
foot	   of	   a	   declaration	   of	   emergency	   must	   be	   proportionate	   to	   the	   exigencies	   of	   the	  
situation.	  Analysis	  of	  the	  relevant	  jurisprudence	  on	  Article	  15,	  principally	  of	  A	  v.	  the	  United	  
Kingdom12	  (hereinafter	  “Belmarsh”),	  and	  Lawless	  v.	  Ireland13	  will	  then	  be	  undertaken	  with	  
a	  view	  to	  assess	  how	  these	  two	  limbs	  are	  applied	  in	  practice.	  In	  light	  of	  this	  assessment,	  I	  
shall	   argue	   that	   the	   ECtHR’s	   jurisprudence	   on	   Article	   15	   is	   not	   accurately	   described	   as	  
conforming	   with	   the	   emergency	   paradigm,	   but	   instead	   incorporates	   elements	   of	   a	  
“business	  as	  usual”	  approach.	  This	  is	  done	  by	  the	  ECtHR	  ignoring	  the	  first	  limb	  of	  Article	  15,	  
regarding	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  state	  of	  emergency.	  The	  threshold	  that	  a	  phenomenon	  must	  
cross	   in	   order	   to	   justify	   a	   declaration	   is	   set	   extremely	   low,	   and	   the	   level	   of	   scrutiny	   the	  
ECtHR	   applies	  when	   assessing	   this	   question	   renders	   the	   first	   limb	  of	   Article	   15	  merely	   a	  
procedural	   hurdle	   to	   be	   crossed,	   rather	   than	   an	   effective	   line	   of	   demarcation	   between	  
normalcy	   and	   emergency.	   Secondly,	   by	   focusing	   only	   on	  whether	   the	  measures	   enacted	  
are	   proportionate	   to	   the	   exigencies	   of	   the	   situation	   (the	   second	   limb),	   a	   state	   of	  
emergency	   is	   viewed	   no	   differently	   than	   any	   other	   ground	   that	   may	   limit	   the	   absolute	  
vindication	   of	   a	   right.	   The	   ECtHR’s	   reasoning	   in	   Belmarsh	   has	   advanced	   this	   further	   by	  
emphasizing	  that	  a	  state	  of	  emergency	  does	  not	  have	  to	  be	  temporary	  and	  in	  doing	  so,	  has	  
abolished	   the	  very	  concept	   that	   justifies	  a	   state	  of	  emergency.14	   Instead,	   the	  duration	  of	  
the	  emergency	  is	  merely	  another	  factor	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  when	  assessing	  whether	  
the	  measures	   taken	   on	   foot	   of	   a	   declaration	   are	   proportionate	   to	   the	   exigencies	   of	   the	  
situation.	  In	  light	  of	  this,	  the	  “shielding”	  effect	  of	  Article	  15	  is	  rendered	  redundant,	  leaving	  
                                            
12	   A	   v.	   Secretary	   of	   State	   for	   the	   Home	   Department	   2	   W.L.R.	   87	   (2005);	   A	   and	   Others	   v.	   United	   Kingdom	  
[hereinafter	   “Belmarsh”],	   Judgment	  of	   19	   February	   2009,	   3455	   Eur.	   Ct.	  H.R.	   5	   (2009).	   This	   case	   concerned	   the	  
legality	  of	  the	  indefinite	  detention	  of	  the	  applicants	  in	  Belmarsh	  Prison,	  London	  under	  s.23	  of	  the	  Anti-­‐Terrorism,	  
Crime	  and	  Security	  Act	  2001.	   
13	  Lawless	  v.	  Ireland	  [hereinafter	  “Lawless”],	  Judgment	  of	  1	  July	  1961,	  3	  Eur.	  Ct.	  H.R	  (ser.	  A,	  1961). 
14	  See	  Belmarsh,	  supra	  note	  12,	  at	  para.	  178. 
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it	   only	   an	   enabler	   of	   encroachment	   on	   human	   rights.	   This	   article	   shall	   conclude	   by	  
advocating	  that	  the	  ECtHR	  apply	  the	  first	  limb	  of	  Article	  15	  and	  insist	  on	  a	  strict	  separation	  
between	   normalcy	   and	   emergency.	   Only	   by	   assessing	   this	   can	   the	   state	   of	   emergency	  




B.	  Legal	  Approaches	  to	  Tackling	  Crises	  
	  
	  
I.	  The	  State	  of	  Emergency	  
	  
Crises	   of	   various	   magnitude	   and	   urgency	   are	   a	   human	   universal.	   Yet	   not	   every	   crisis	  
equates	  to	  an	  “emergency.”	  Rather,	  the	  word	  describes	  crises	  at	  the	  extreme	  end	  of	  this	  
matrix	   of	   “magnitude”	   and	   “urgency.”15	   “Emergency”	   therefore	   does	   not	   describe	   a	  
specific	   phenomenon,	   but	   instead	   is	   an	   umbrella	   term,	   indicative	   of	   a	   group	   or	   set	   of	  
shared	   conditions.	   Underneath	   this	   umbrella	   there	   is	   a	   core	   meaning	   of	   “emergency,”	  
encompassing	  phenomena	   (and	   consequently	   the	  necessity	   for	   an	   exceptional	   response)	  
that	   undisputedly	   come	  under	   this	   term.	   16	   Thus	   a	  war	  or	   armed	   insurrection	  may	  meet	  
this	   threshold	   of	   magnitude	   and	   urgency,	   as	   would	   a	   serious	   natural	   disaster	   or	   the	  
outbreak	   of	   disease,	   despite	   the	   substantive	   differences	   between	   these	   phenomena.	  
However,	   it	   is	   in	   the	   penumbra	   that	   debates	   arise.	   This	   penumbra	   must	   be	   necessarily	  
broad	  and	  undefined,	  given	  the	  intangible,	  sudden	  and	  unforeseen	  nature	  of	  “emergency.”	  
Hence,	  restriction	  by	  a	  more	  rigorous	  definition	  is	  of	  minimal	  assistance.17	  That	  conceded,	  
if	   there	  must	  exist	   a	   core	  of	   settled	  meaning	  within	   the	   term	  “emergency,”	   so	   too	  must	  
there	  exist	  a	  similar	  core	  of	  settled	  meaning	  of	  instances	  that	  do	  not	  equate	  to	  emergency;	  
i.e.	   the	   identification	   of	   when	   an	   emergency	   has	   ended,	   or	   when	   circumstances	   never	  
equated	  to	  an	  emergency	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  
	  
                                            
15	   As	   delineated	   by	   lexicological	   sources,	   the	   Oxford	   English	   Dictionary	   defines	   an	   emergency	   as	   “a	   serious,	  
unexpected,	   and	   often	   dangerous	   situation	   requiring	   immediate	   action;”	  Emergency	  Definition,	  OXFORD	   ENGLISH	  
DICTIONARY	   (2010),	   available	   at:	   http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/61130?redirectedFrom=emergency#eid	   (last	  
accessed:	   27	   September	   2011);	   Merriam	   Webster’s	   Dictionary	   defines	   an	   emergency	   as	   (1)“the	   unforeseen	  
combination	   of	   circumstances	   or	   the	   resulting	   state	   that	   calls	   for	   immediate	   action	   or	   (2)	   an	   urgent	   need	   for	  
assistance	   or	   relief;”	   Emergency	   Definition,	   Merriam-­‐Webster	   Dictionary	   (2010),	   available	   at:	  
http://www.merriam-­‐webster.com/dictionary/emergency	  (last	  accessed:	  29	  September	  2011).	  	  
16	  See	  generally,	  Herbert	  Lionel	  Adolphus	  Hart,	  Positivism	  and	  the	  Separation	  of	  Law	  and	  Morals,	  71	  HARV.	  L.	  REV.	  
593	  (1958). 
17	   	  Hence	  the	  emphasis	  of	   the	  “unforeseen”	  or	  “unexpected”	  nature	  of	   the	  crisis	   in	   the	   lexicological	  definitions	  
outlined	  above;	   see	  supra	  note	  15.	  See	  also	  Oren	  Gross,	  Once	  More	  Unto	  the	  Breach:	  The	  Systematic	  Failure	  of	  
Applying	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  to	  Entrenched	  Emergencies	  23	  YALE	  J.	  INT’L	  L.	  437,	  438	  (1998). 
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In	   times	   of	   such	   crises	   a	   response	   is	   necessary.	   Consequently,	   definitions	   of	   emergency,	  
both	   legal	   and	   lexicological,	   not	  only	   attempt	   to	   identify	   crises	   that	  may	  qualify	   as	   such,	  
but	   also	   envisage	   responses	   to	   these	   events.18	   A	   “state	   of	   emergency”	   is	   not	   merely	   a	  
description	  of	   the	  status	  of	  affairs	   in	  existence,	  but	  a	  response	  by	  the	  state	  to	  tackle	   the	  
crisis.	  While	  the	  “phenomenon”	  and	  the	  “response”	  are	  two	  separate	  components	  of	  the	  
notion	   of	   emergency,	   they	   are	   inter-­‐related,	   and	   are	   not	   wholly	   severable,	   with	   each	  
influencing	  the	  other.	  They	  are	  two	  different	  sides	  of	  the	  same	  coin	  that	   is	  “emergency.”	  
Just	  as	  every	  crisis	  may	  not	  correspond	  to	  an	  emergency,	  so	  too	  every	  response	  to	  a	  crisis	  
may	  not	  warrant	  the	  declaration	  of	  a	  state	  of	  emergency.	  A	  phenomenon	  only	  constitutes	  
an	   emergency	  when	  normal	   responses	   to	   the	   threat	   are	   ineffectual.19	   There	  must	   be	   an	  
essential	   weakness	   in	   the	   ordinary	   coping	   systems	   that	   the	   implementation	   of	   an	  
emergency	  response	  attempts	  to	  rectify.20	  The	  effect	  of	  such	  a	  declaration	  of	  emergency	  is	  
to	  permit	  and	  facilitate	  a	  response	  that	  would	  not	  be	  possible	  were	  normal	  conditions	  to	  
prevail.	   It	   is	   thus	   not	   merely	   the	   crisis	   or	   phenomenon,	   but	   also	   the	   response	   that	   is	  
beyond	  the	  norm.	  Normalcy	  is	  the	  necessary	  background	  against	  which	  one	  can	  judge	  the	  
existence	  of	  a	  state	  of	  emergency.21	  Once	  this	   is	  declared,	  normalcy	  no	   longer	  exists,	   i.e.	  
the	   two	   conditions	   are	   mutually	   exclusive,	   and	   must	   be	   considered	   in	   terms	   of	   a	  
dichotomized	   dialectic.22	   Normalcy	   however,	   must	   be	   the	   empirical	   regularity	   and	  
emergency	  the	  exception	  to	  it.23	  In	  light	  of	  this	  aberrational	  nature,	  a	  state	  of	  emergency	  
may	  sometimes	  be	  described	  as	  a	  “state	  of	  exception.”24	  The	  aim	  of	   the	  declaration	  of	  a	  
state	   of	   emergency	   is	   to	   respond	   to	   a	   perceived	   threat	   at	   hand.	   Once	   this	   threat	   is	  
defeated	  there	   is	  no	  need	  for	   the	  response	  to	  continue.	  A	  state	  of	  emergency	  therefore,	  
should	   be	   self-­‐destructive,	   with	   its	   ultimate	   goal	   being	   the	   restoration	   of	   normalcy.25	  
                                            
18	  The	  second	  definition	  proffered	  by	  Merriam-­‐Webster’s	  only	  refers	  to	  the	  response	  element	  of	  emergency,	  and	  
there	  is	  no	  mention	  of	  what	  phenomenon	  would	  induce	  such	  a	  need;	  see	  supra	  note	  15.	  	   
19	  See,	  for	  example,	  Washington	  State	  Legislature,	  The	  Washington	  State	  Emergency	  Action	  Plan,	  (2000),	  available	  
at:	   	   http://www.emd.wa.gov/plans/documents/emergency_operations_plan.doc	   (last	   accessed:	   27	   September	  
2011),	   which	   includes	   as	   an	   integral	   part	   of	   the	   definition	   of	   emergency	   that	   the	   response	  must	   be	   “beyond	  
routine	  incident	  response	  resources.”	  	  Similarly,	  the	  Irish	  Office	  of	  Emergency	  Planning	  requires	  the	  phenomenon	  
to	  be	  “beyond	  the	  normal	  capabilities	  of	  the	  principal	  emergency	  services”	  before	  an	  emergency	  can	  be	  declared.	  
See	   Office	   of	   Emergency	   Planning,	   Department	   of	   Defence,	   Strategic	   Emergency	   Planning	   Response	   (2004),	  
available	  at:	  www.emergencyplanning.ie/media/docs/1SEPG.doc	  (last	  accessed:	  29	  September	  2011).	   
20	   John	   Ferejohn	   &	   Pasquale	   Pasquino,	   The	   Law	   of	   the	   Exception:	   A	   Typology	   of	   Emergency	   Powers,	   2	  
INTERNATIONAL	  JOURNAL	  OF	  CONSTITUTIONAL	  LAW	  210	  (2004). 
21	  See	  Gross,	  supra	  note	  17,	  at	  439-­‐440. 
22	  Id. 
23	  Id. 
24	  See	  AGAMBEN,	  supra	  note	  7. 
25	  See	  Richard	  Lillich,	  The	  Paris	  Minimum	  Standards	  of	  Human	  Rights	  Norms	  in	  a	  State	  of	  Emergency	  79	  AM.	  J.	  INT’L	  
LAW	  1072,	  1073	  (1985)	  [hereinafter	  “The	  Paris	  Minimum	  Standards”].	  See	  also	  Questiaux,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  15. 
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Without	   this,	   emergency	   and	   normalcy	   would	   not	   be	   framed	   in	   a	   mutually	   exclusive	  
relationship.	   Rather	   an	   emergency	   response	   would	   merely	   result	   in	   the	   alteration	   of	  
normalcy.	  
	  
By	   declaring	   a	   state	   of	   emergency,	   a	   country	   is	   free	   from	   the	   ordinary	   shackles	   that	  
constrain	  it.	  In	  a	  liberal	  democratic	  order,	  these	  constraints	  are	  generally	  human	  rights,	  the	  
separation	  of	  powers	  doctrine	  and	  the	  rule	  of	  law.	  This	  article	  is	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  
derogation	   clauses	   and	   human	   rights—	   namely	   Article	   15	   of	   the	   ECHR.	   As	   suggested,	  
Article	  15	  permits	  a	  state	  to	  derogate	  from	  its	  human	  rights	  obligations	  under	  the	  ECHR,	  by	  
enacting	   laws	   and	  other	  measures	   that	  may	  encroach	  upon	   the	   freedoms	  and	  principles	  
the	  ECHR	  seeks	  to	  protect.	  Once	  a	  state	  recognizes	  that	  there	  are	  instances	  in	  which	  these	  
principles	   do	   not	   apply,	   it	   is	   essentially	   admitting	   that	   these	   fundamental	   principles	   are	  
conditional,	  and	  not	  absolute.	  26	  
	  
The	  assumption	  of	  a	   separation	  between	  normalcy	  and	  emergency	   is	   the	   cornerstone	  of	  
the	  emergency	  paradigm.	  This	  notion	  is	  often	  traced	  back	  to	  the	  Roman	  Dictatorship—	  the	  
archetypal	   emergency	   response	   mechanism.27	   The	   emergency-­‐normalcy	   dichotomy	   is	  
aided	   by	   geographical,	   individual	   and	   temporal	   demarcations.28	   The	   geographical	   impact	  
zone	  of	  an	  emergency	  should	  be	  clearly	  identifiable	  from	  unaffected	  areas.	  Thus,	  the	  scene	  
of	   devastation	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   a	   natural	   disaster,	   or	   a	   war	   zone,	   would	   look	  
substantially	  different	  from	  other	  areas	  not	  afflicted.29	  Individual	  separation	  focuses	  on	  the	  
idea	   of	   a	   clear	   distinction	   between	   “friend”	   and	   “enemy.”30	   Thus,	   the	   enemy	   soldier	   in	  
uniform	   is	   distinguishable	   from	   the	   state’s	   own	   soldiers,	   or	   its	   civilians.	   Finally,	   as	  
mentioned	  previously,	  the	  notion	  of	  an	  exception	  envisages	  a	  situation	  that	  is	  temporary.	  
Once	   the	   threat	   it	   defeated,	   normalcy	   resumes	   and	   the	   emergency	   is	   over.	   It	   is	   this	  
temporality	   of	   emergency	   that	   makes	   often-­‐draconian	   measures	   palatable.	   Once	   the	  
emergency	  is	  over,	  these	  measures	  should	  also	  cease	  to	  exist.	  	  
	  
Many	  academics	  argue	  however,	   that	  as	  empirical	  evidence	   in	  modernity	  has	  shown,	  the	  
state	   of	   emergency	   has	   now	   become	   so	   frequent	   that	   it	   is	   essentially	   permanent.31	  
Numerous	   states	   from	   a	   variety	   of	   cultural	   and	   legal	   backgrounds	   have	   experienced	  
                                            
26	  See	  CLINTON	  ROSSITER,	  CONSTITUTIONAL	  DICTATORSHIP:	  CRISIS	  GOVERNMENT	  IN	  THE	  MODERN	  DEMOCRACIES	  294	  (2002). 
27	  See	  ROSSITER,	  id.	  at	  	  Chap.	  1;	  NICCOLO	  MACHIAVELLI,	  DISCORSI	  SOPRA	  LA	  PRIMA	  DECA	  DI	  TITO	  LIVIO	  (The	  Discourses	  on	  Livy)	  
Chap.	  XXXIII-­‐XXXV	  (ca.	  1517);	  GROSS	  &	  NÍ	  AOLÁIN,	  supra	  	  note	  10,	  at	  17-­‐26;	  Ferejohn	  &	  	  Pasquino,	  supra	  note	  20,	  at	  
211-­‐213,	  223-­‐228.	  	  
28	  See	  Gross,	  supra	  note	  6,	  at	  1073-­‐1082. 
29	  Id. 
30	  Id. 
31	  See	  AGAMBEN,	  supra	  note	  7;	  see	  also	  Gross	  id.	  at	  1089-­‐1094. 
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declarations	   of	   emergency	   that	   have	   endured	   for	   decades.32	   Similarly,	   so	   called	  
“temporary”	   legislation	   is	   repeatedly	   extended	   and	   renewed,	   despite	   the	   presence	   of	  
sunset	   clauses	   designed	   to	   provide	   a	   temporal	   limitation	   on	   such	   powers.33	   If	   it	   can	   be	  
shown	   that	   the	   emergency	   paradigm	   is	   incapable	   of	   restoring	   normalcy,	   it	   must	   be	  
rejected,	   as	   such	   a	   mechanism,	   which	   was	   inspired	   by	   the	   Roman	   Republic	   over	   2,000	  
years	   ago	   is	   no	   longer	   suitable	   for	   modernity.	   Rejection	   of	   the	   emergency	   paradigm	  
appears	  to	  stem	  from	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  phenomena	  in	  modernity	  that	  trigger	  a	  state	  of	  
emergency	  are	  often	   incapable	  of	  separation	  from	  the	  background	  of	  normalcy,	  resulting	  
in	  an	  “entrenched”	  or	  “perpetual”	  emergency.34	  	  Modern	  threats	  to	  the	  state	  often	  come	  
in	   the	   intangible	   form	   of	   terrorism.35	   The	   perpetrators	   of	   such	   acts	  wear	   no	   identifiable	  
uniform	  in	  order	  to	  blur	  the	  distinction	  between	  friend	  and	  enemy.36	  The	  modus	  operandi	  
of	   the	   terrorist	   in	   turn	   distorts	   the	   lines	   between	   war	   and	   the	   criminal	   justice	   system,	  
                                            
32	  E.g.	   Ireland	  was	  under	  an	  official	  declaration	  of	  emergency	   in	  accordance	  with	  Art.28(3)(3)	  of	   its	  constitution	  
from	  the	  outbreak	  of	  World	  War	  II	  in	  1939	  until	  1976.	  The	  day	  after	  it	  was	  lifted,	  a	  new	  state	  of	  emergency	  was	  
declared	   to	   deal	   with	   the	   increasingly	   violent	   situation	   in	   Northern	   Ireland.	   This	   lasted	   until	   1995;	   See	   the	  
Constitution	  of	  Ireland,	  enacted	  1	  July	  1937.	  Israel	  has	  effectively	  been	  in	  a	  state	  of	  emergency	  since	  its	  inception	  
as	  a	  sovereign	  state	  in	  1949.	  See	  Adam	  Mizock,	  The	  Legality	  of	  the	  Fifty-­‐Two	  Year	  State	  of	  Emergency	  in	  Israel,	  7	  
DAVIS	  JOURNAL	  OF	  INTERNATIONAL	  LAW	  AND	  POLICY	  223	  (2001).	  Egypt	  has	  been	  in	  a	  persistent	  state	  of	  emergency	  since	  
1981,	  and	  for	  all	  but	  four	  years	  since	  1957.	  Despite	  a	  popular	  movement	  that	  ousted	  President	  Hosni	  Mubarak	  in	  
February	  2011,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  writing	  (July	  2011),	  the	  state	  of	  emergency	  he	  declared	  in	  1981	  remains	  in	  force.	  On	  
24	  February	  2011,	  Algeria	  lifted	  its	  19-­‐year	  state	  of	  emergency	  following	  a	  period	  of	  popular	  public	  protest.	  The	  
state	  of	  emergency	  proclaimed	  in	  Syria	  on	  9	  March	  1963,	  effectuating	  Legislative	  Decree	  No.	  51	  of	  22	  December	  
1962,	  remained	  in	  force	  until	  21	  April	  2011.	  However,	  one	  can	  hardly	  describe	  the	  condition	  in	  Syria	  at	  the	  time	  of	  
writing	   to	   correlate	  with	  normalcy,	   equating	   instead	  with	   a	  de	   facto	   state	  of	   emergency.	  See	  Questiaux,	   supra	  
note	  3,	  at	  26.	  
33	  E.g.	  The	  Uniting	  and	  Strengthening	  America	  by	  Providing	  Appropriate	  Tools	  Required	  to	  Intercept	  and	  Obstruct	  
Terrorism	  Act	  of	  2001,	  also	  known	  as	  the	  Patriot	  Act,	  enacted	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  11	  September	  2001,	  originally	  
contained	   16	   provisions	   due	   to	   sunset	   on	   31	   December	   2005.	   14	   of	   these	   were	   made	   permanent,	   and	   the	  
remainder	   repeatedly	   renewed.	   They	   are	   now	   expected	   to	   sunset	   on	   1	   June	   2015.	   	   The	   Northern	   Ireland	  
Emergency	  Powers	  Act	   1973	   (EPA),	  was	   renewed	   in	   1978,	   1987,	   1991	   and	  1996,	   before	  being	   replaced	  by	   the	  
Terrorism	  Act	  2000	  (2000	  Act).	  The	  2000	  Act	  re-­‐enacted	  the	  EPA	  1996	  provisions	  under	  Part	  VII,	  subject	  to	  annual	  
renewal.	  This	  lapsed	  on	  31	  July	  2007,	  ending	  the	  34-­‐	  year	  life	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  “emergency	  provisions.”	  Similarly,	  
the	  Prevention	  of	  Terrorism	  (Temporary	  Provisions)	  Act	  1974	  (PTA)	  despite	  a	  sunset	  clause	  that	  was	  repeatedly	  
renewed	   repeatedly	   every	   5	   years,	   until	   replaced	   by	   the	   Terrorism	   Act	   (2000),	   which	   made	   the	   measures	  
permanent.	   
34	   See	   Neocleus,	   supra	   note	   4,	   at	   191-­‐194.	   Neocleus	   himself	   rejects	   this	   argument,	   suggesting	   instead	   that	  
“permanent	  emergency”	  is	  primarily	  caused	  by	  the	  use	  of	  emergency	  powers	  to	  deal	  with	  an	  increasing	  array	  of	  
phenomena	  of	  ever-­‐decreasing	  severity. 
35	  This	  is	  illustrated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  “terrorism”	  avoids	  a	  universally	  accepted	  legal	  definition.	  See	  Jorg	  Friedrichs,	  
Defining	  the	  International	  Public	  Enemy:	  The	  Political	  Struggle	  Behind	  the	  Legal	  Debate	  on	  International	  Terrorism	  
19	  LEIDEN	  JOURNAL	  OF	  INTERNATIONAL	  LAW	  69	  (2006). 
36The	  “terrorist”	  shares	  many	  of	  the	  same	  substantive	  characteristics	  of	  the	  “partisan”	  fighter:	  an	  irregular	  soldier	  
who	  generally	  utilizes	  hit-­‐and-­‐run	  tactics	  against	  a	  militarily	  superior	  force.	  It	  is	  therefore	  in	  the	  advantage	  of	  the	  
partisan	  to	  blend	  into	  the	  background	  of	  the	  ordinary	  population	  in	  order	  to	  evade	  detection	  and	  by	  extension,	  
attack	  the	  enemy	  most	  effectively.	  See	  generally	  CARL	  SCHMITT,	  THEORY	  OF	  THE	  PARTISAN	  (2007). 
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creating	  a	  novel	  challenge	  to	  the	  response	  mechanisms	  of	  the	  state.37	  Terrorist	  acts	  are	  not	  
confined	   to	   the	   battlefield	   but	   take	   place	   primarily	   in	   urban	   areas	   where	   every	   day	   life	  
happens.	  The	  physical,	  economic,	  emotional	  and	  political	  effects	  of	  these	  actions	  may	  be	  
felt	  far	  beyond	  the	  immediate	  zone	  of	  a	  specific	  attack.	  In	  the	  aftermath	  of	  11	  September	  
2001,	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council	  passed	  Security	  Council	  Resolution	  1368	  (2001)	  requiring	  all	  
member	  states	  to	  pass	  laws	  dealing	  with	  terrorism.	  The	  impact	  of	  the	  attack	  on	  the	  United	  
States	   (US)	   transcended	   borders	   and	   plunged	   the	  world	   into	   an	   emergency.	   The	   United	  
Kingdom	   (UK),	   thousands	  of	  miles	   away	   from	   “Ground	  Zero”	   lodged	  a	  derogation	  notice	  
under	  Article	  15	  with	  the	  ECHR	  as	  a	  response	  to	  the	  apparent	  threat	  posed	  by	  Al	  Qaeda.	  	  
	  
Identification	   of	   when	   a	   certain	   terrorist	   threat	   is	   neutralized	   and	   normalcy	   restored	   is	  
particularly	  difficult.	  The	  conflict	  in	  Northern	  Ireland,	  drawn	  out	  over	  30	  years,	  only	  came	  
to	   an	   end	   once	   the	   Belfast	   Agreement	   1998	   was	   signed	   between	   respective	   political	  
parties.	   For	   those	   three	   decades,	   “the	   troubles”	   became	   an	   everyday	   occurrence	   and	  
emergency	  became	  the	  norm.	  Indeed,	  certain	  dissidents,	  dissatisfied	  with	  the	  agreement,	  
still	   continue	   their	   campaign,	   albeit	   with	   diminished	   capabilities.	   The	   propensity	   for	   an	  
emergency	   to	  become	  perpetuated	  and	  entrenched	   increases	   substantially	  when	  dealing	  
with	   a	   group	   like	   Al	   Qaeda,	   without	   a	   centralized	   command	   structure,38	   and	   with	   the	  
ambitious	  goal	  of	   the	  destruction	  of	  Western	  Civilization.39	  The	   improbability	  of	   this	  goal	  
coupled	   with	   a	   splintered	   command	   structure	   results	   in	   a	   threat,	   the	   neutralization	   of	  
which	  becomes	  increasingly	  difficult	  to	  identify.	  The	  improbability	  of	  this	  goal	  coupled	  with	  
a	   splintered	   command	   structure	   results	   in	  a	   threat,	   the	  neutralization	  of	  which	  becomes	  
increasingly	  difficult	  to	  identify.	  Hence,	  the	  appointment	  by	  Al	  Qaeda	  of	  Ayman	  Al-­‐Zawahiri	  
as	  a	  new	   leader	  of	  Al	  Qaeda	   suggests	   that	   the	   “war	  on	   terror”	  will	   continue	  beyond	   the	  
“watershed”40	  moment	  of	  the	  killing	  of	  former	  Al	  Qaeda	  leader	  Osama	  Bin	  Laden	  on	  2	  May	  
                                            
37	   See	   Robert	   Chesney	   &	   Jack	   Goldsmith,	   Terrorism	   and	   the	   Convergence	   of	   Criminal	   and	   Military	   Detention	  
Models,	  60	  STAN.	  L.	  REV.	  1079	  (2008). 
38	  Al	  Qaeda	  has	  been	  described	  loosely	  as	  merely	  constituting	  a	  shared	  ideology	  as	  opposed	  to	  an	  organization.	  
See	  Burke	   Jason,	  Al	  Qaeda,	   FOREIGN	  POLICY	   (FP)	  18	   (2004).	   	  Naim	  considers	  Al	  Qaeda	   to	  be	  a	   “loose	  network	  of	  
individuals	  united	  by	  a	   shared	  passion	   for	  a	   single	   cause,”	   similar	   to	  NGOs.	  See	  Moises	  Naim,	  Missing	  Links:	  Al	  
Qaeda,	  the	  NGO,	  FP	  100	  (2002).	  General	  consensus	  appears	  to	  be	  that	  Al	  Qaeda,	  particularly	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  
11	  September	  2001,	  operates	  as	  a	   loose	  network	  of	   independent	  cells,	  with	  a	  diminished	  centralized	  command	  
structure.	  See	  Chesney	  &	  Goldsmith,	  supra	  note	  37,	  at	  2109. 
39	  Burke	  argues	  that	  Al	  Qaeda	  seeks	  not	  to	  conquest,	  but	  to	  beat	  back	  western	  crusades	  from	  Islamic	  territory.	  
Nevertheless,	  Wedgwood	   describes	   Al	   Qaeda’s	  methods	   as	   shifting	   from	   pogrom	   to	   extermination	   of	  western	  
peoples.	  See	  Ruth	  Wedgwood,	  Al	  Qaeda,	  Military	  Commissions,	  and	  American	  Self-­‐Defense,	  117	  POLITICAL	  SCIENCE	  
QUARTERLY	   357	   (2002).	   This	   is	   corroborated	   by	   the	   severity	   of	   the	   attacks	   of	   11	   September	   2001,	   	   which	  
undermines	   the	   now-­‐defunct	   idea	   that	   terrorist	   groups	  would	   limit	   the	  magnitude	   of	   their	   attacks	   in	   order	   to	  
prevent	  would-­‐be	  sympathizers	  to	  their	  cause	  from	  becoming	  disenfranchised.	  See	  Chesney	  &	  Goldsmith,	  supra	  
note	  37,	  at	  1094. 
40	  As	  described	  by	  UN	  Secretary	  General	  Ban	  ki-­‐moon:	  Bin	  Laden’s	  death	  is	  'watershed	  moment'	  says	  Ban	  Ki	  Moon	  
(sic),	   BBC	   NEWS,	   May	   2,	   2011,	   available	   at:	   	   http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-­‐us-­‐canada-­‐13260609	   (last	  
accessed:	  27	  September	  2011). 
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2011.	  41	  The	  resultant	  effect	  of	  the	  modern	  terroristic	  threat	  is	  that	  emergencies	  are	  now	  
intangible,	   and	   no	   longer	   easily	   identifiable	   or	   limited	   to	   individual,	   spatial	   or	   temporal	  
contexts.	  	  
	  
This	   article	   will	   show	   that	   these	   arguments,	   which	   suggest	   it	   is	   impossible	   today	   to	  
separate	   normalcy	   from	   emergency,	   due	   to	   the	   more	   dangerous,	   factual	   conditions	   of	  
modernity,	   do	   not	   adequately	   explain	   why	   the	   “state	   of	   emergency”	   is	   now	   the	   norm.	  
Emergencies	   ideally	   constitute	   a	   threat	   to	   the	   life	   of	   the	   nation.	   In	   utilizing	   emergency	  
responses	   when	   dealing	   with	   increasingly	   less	   serious	   threats,	   the	   state	   erodes	   this	  
definition,	   by	   lowering	   its	   threshold	   to	   encompass	   instances	   that	   do	   not	   threaten	   the	  
existence	  of	  the	  state,	  and	  stretching	  it	  to	  a	  point	  where	  it	  absorbs	  phenomena	  that	  exist	  
in	   normalcy.	   Consequently,	   there	   appears	   a	   negligible	   difference	   between	   normalcy	   and	  
emergency,	  and	  emergency	  responses	  become	  viewed	  as	  increasingly	  normalized.	  
	  
	  
II.	  “Business	  as	  Usual”	  Models	  
	  
The	   emergency	   paradigm	   endorses	   the	   view	   that	   there	   are	   situations	   that	   the	   ordinary	  
legal	  system	  cannot	  deal	  with.	  The	   liberal-­‐democratic	  order	   therefore,	  becomes	  qualified	  
to	  do	  so,	  and	  may	  only	  exist	  when	  the	  requisite	  conditions	  in	  which	  this	  liberal	  democratic	  
order	  may	  be	  realized	  to	  also	  exist.	  For	  Carl	  Schmitt,	  this	  represented	  the	  fundamental	  flaw	  
in	  liberalism.42	  Admission	  that	  liberalism	  is	  insufficient	  to	  protect	  the	  security	  of	  the	  state	  
and	  its	  citizens	  means	  that	  the	  liberal	  democratic	  order	  of	  the	  state	  must	  reach	  for	  a	  more	  
violent,	   direct,	   and	   ultimately	   (from	   a	   liberal	   point	   of	   view)	   hypocritical	   mechanism	   to	  
ensure	  the	  survival	  of	  the	  state.	  For	  Schmitt,	  this	  fundamental	  flaw	  leads	  to	  the	  rejection	  of	  
liberalism,	  and	  an	  endorsement	  of	  a	  sovereign	  dictatorial	  regime.43	  For	  others,	  this	  leads	  to	  
the	  rejection	  of	  the	  emergency	  paradigm.44	  
	  
                                            
41	  Michael	   Jansen,	   Zawahiri	   announced	   by	   Al	   Qaeda	   as	   successor	   to	   late	   Bin	   Laden,	   IRISH	   TIMES,	   Jun.	   17,	   2011,	  




1859	  (last	  accessed:	  27	  September	  2011).	  	  See	  also	  President	  Barack	  Obama’s	  indications	  that	  the	  war	  on	  terror	  is	  
likely	  to	  continue:	  CNNPolitics,	  Statement	  from	  President	  Obama	  on	  death	  of	  Osama	  bin	  Laden,	  CNN,	  May	  2,	  2011,	  
available	   at:	   http://articles.cnn.com/2011-­‐05-­‐02/politics/statement.obama_1_qaeda-­‐bin-­‐terrorist-­‐
attacks?_s=PM:POLITICS	  (last	  accessed:	  27	  September	  2011). 
42	  See	  generally,	  CARL	  SCHMITT,	  POLITICAL	  THEOLOGY:	  FOUR	  CHAPTERS	  ON	  THE	  CONCEPT	  OF	  SOVEREIGNTY	  (1988). 
43	  Id. 
44	  See	  the	  above	  discussion	  at	  note	  8.	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“Monism”45	   or	   “business	   as	  usual”46	  models	   of	   crisis	  management	   reject	   the	  notion	   that	  
emergencies	  justify	  any	  alteration	  in	  the	  ordinary	  scheme	  of	  governance.	  The	  legal	  system	  
is	   perceived	   as	   able	   to	   accommodate	   any	   situation	   that	   it	   faces.	   Emergency	   therefore	  
creates	   no	   additional	   power	   that	   the	   state	   may	   use	   to	   defend	   itself.47	   Under	   this	  
construction,	   it	   would	   appear	   that	   the	   executive	   and	   other	   national	   authorities	   are	  
afforded	   no	   more	   leeway	   than	   in	   ordinary	   times	   to	   promote	   and	   protect	   the	   common	  
good.	   The	   above	   rationalizations	   for	   an	   emergency	   response—	   flexibility,	   urgency,	   and	  
necessity	   are	   not	   considered	   to	  warrant	   a	   deviation	   from	   the	   liberal-­‐democratic	   order’s	  
respect	  for	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  the	  separation	  of	  powers	  doctrine,	  and	  for	  human	  rights.48	  	  
	  
“The	  United	   States	   represents	   a	  prime	  example	  of	   ‘business	   as	  usual.’”49	  Apart	   from	   the	  
provision	   that	  Congress	  may	  suspend	   the	  writ	  of	  habeas	  corpus	   in	  a	   time	  of	  war,	   the	  US	  
Constitution	  is	  silent	  on	  emergency	  powers.	  This	  has	  led	  the	  US	  Supreme	  Court	  to	  hold	  in	  
the	  ex	  Parte	  Milligan	  case,50	   that	   the	  same	   law	  applies	   in	  war	  as	   in	  peace.	  The	   idea	   that	  
emergency	   could	   create	   additional	   powers	   for	   the	   executive	   or	   other	   branches	   of	  
governance	  was	  rejected	  by	  Justice	  Davis,	  arguing	  that	  this	  would	  lead	  to	  the	  usurpation	  of	  
liberty	  by	  those	  more	  interested	  in	  power	  than	  in	  benevolent	  rule.51	  One	  could	  therefore	  
envisage	  the	  “business	  as	  usual”	  approach	  to	  offer	  a	  more	  robust	  defense	  of	  human	  rights	  
than	   the	   state	   of	   emergency,	   which	   permits	   derogations	   from	   prescribed	   norms	   from	  
which	  an	  aggrieved	  individual	  has	  no	  recourse.	  Instead,	  these	  norms	  continue	  to	  bind	  the	  
state,	   legitimizing	  only	  that	  action	  permitted	  by	  the	  parameters	  of	   the	   liberal	  democratic	  
constitution.	   In	   reality	   however,	   the	   perceived	   perception	   of	   the	   necessity	   of	   draconian	  
measures	  often	  results	   in	  emergency	  powers	  becoming	  cloaked	   in	  a	  “veil	  of	  normalcy,”52	  
leading	   to	   the	  “normalisation	  of	   the	  exception.”53	   Instead	  of	  human	   rights	   in	  a	  period	  of	  
emergency	  being	  afforded	   the	   same	   level	  of	  protection	  as	   in	  normalcy,	   those	  during	   the	  
latter	  state	  are	  diminished	  to	  the	  same	  level	  as	  in	  the	  time	  of	  the	  former.	  This	  is	  illustrated	  
by	   the	   Korematsu54	   case,	   in	   which	   the	   US	   Supreme	   Court	   held	   that	   the	   removal	   and	  
                                            
45	  See	  Zuckerman,	  supra	  note	  9,	  at	  524. 
46	  See	  GROSS	  &	  NÍ	  AOLÁIN,	  	  supra	  note	  10,	  	  Chap.	  2. 
47	  Id. 
48	  See	  Zuckerman,	  supra	  note	  9,	  at	  524. 
49	  See	  GROSS	  &	  NÍ	  AOLÁIN,	  supra	  note	  10,	  at	  89. 
50	  See	  ex	  Parte	  Milligan,	  supra	  note	  11. 
51	  Id.	  at	  125. 
52
	  See	  GROSS	  &	  NÍ	  AOLÁIN,	  	  supra	  note	  10,	  at	  103.	   
53	  Jean	  Cohen,	  Whose	  Sovereignty?	  Empire	  or	  International	  Law?	  18	  ETHICS	  AND	  INTERNATIONAL	  AFFAIRS	  1	  (2004). 
54	  Korematsu	  v.	  United	  States,	  323	  U.S.	  214	  (1933).	   
	  	   	   	  	  	  	  [Vol.	  12	  No.	  10 1774	   G e rman 	   L aw 	   J o u r n a l 	  
internment	   of	   all	   Japanese-­‐US	   citizens	   along	   the	   Pacific	   coast	   of	   the	  US	  was	   compatible	  
with	  the	  US	  Constitution.	  
	  
The	   “business	   as	   usual”	   model	   is	   therefore,	   often	   criticized	   as	   naive	   and	   hypocritical,	  
standing	  vastly	  out	  of	  line	  with	  reality.55	  The	  forceful	  language	  of	  the	  US	  Supreme	  Court	  in	  
ex	  Parte	  Milligan	  was	  enounced	  in	  1864,	  once	  the	  guns	  of	  the	  US	  civil	  war	  were	  silent	  and	  
the	  Union	   secured.56	   In	   contrast,	  Korematsu	  was	   decided	   at	   the	   height	   of	  World	  War	   II.	  
Judicial	  activism	  and	  oversight	  of	  the	  executive	  appears	  to	  be	  tempered	  during	  periods	  of	  
extreme	  crisis,	  i.e.	  a	  level	  of	  flexibility	  is	  afforded	  the	  executive,	  regardless	  of	  what	  the	  law	  
insists.57	   However,	   as	   this	   flexibility	   itself	   becomes	   law,	   it	   sets	   a	   precedent	   that	  
fundamentally	   alters	   the	   base	   of	   US	   constitutional	   law,	   which	   itself	   leads	   to	   the	  
“normalization	  of	  the	  exception.”58	  
	  
From	  this	  very	  brief	  analysis	  of	  emergency	  responses,	  we	  can	  glean	  a	  constant	  theme	  that	  
recurs	  both	  in	  the	  	  “business	  as	  usual”	  and	  the	  emergency	  paradigm	  approach—	  that	  the	  
executive	  or	  political	  sphere	  is	  best	  placed	  to	  assess	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  state	  of	  emergency,	  
or	   to	   determine	   the	   necessity	   of	   an	   extraordinary	   response.59	   Emergencies	   are	   by	  
definition,	   unforeseen	   and	   require	   swift	   and	   immediate	   action.	   As	   the	   legal	   sphere	   and	  
indeed,	   the	   legislature	   are	   often	   slow	   in	   decision-­‐making,	   they	   are	   not	   (particularly	   the	  
judiciary)	  considered	  appropriate	  forums	  in	  which	  to	  decide	  the	  above	  issues.60	  In	  addition,	  
the	   assessment	   of	   the	   factual	   situation	   may	   require	   debate	   of	   issues	   of	   national	   state	  
security,	  the	  revealing	  of	  which	  could	  jeopardize	  the	  emergency	  response	  effort.61	  As	  the	  
executive	   is	   generally	   afforded	   a	   level	   of	   secrecy,	   it	   is	   often	   considered	   best	   placed	   to	  
assess	   the	   threat.62	   Consequently,	   judges	   often	   defer	   on	   the	   issue	   of	   the	   existence	   of	   a	  
state	  of	  emergency,	  leaving	  the	  issue	  to	  political	  actors	  and	  according	  them	  a	  wide	  margin	  
                                            
55	  See	  GROSS	  &	  NÍ	  AOLÁIN,	  supra	  note	  10,	  at	  95. 
56	  Id.	  at	  96. 
57	  Mark	  Tushnet,	  Controlling	  Executive	  Power	  in	  the	  War	  on	  Terrorism,	  18	  HARV.	  L.	  REV.	  2673,	  2675	  (2005). 
58	  See	  Zuckerman,	  supra	  note	  9,	  at	  532-­‐533. 
59	  ERIC	  A.	  POSNER	  &	  ADRIAN	  VERMEULE,	  TERROR	  IN	  THE	  BALANCE:	  SECURITY,	  LIBERTY	  AND	  THE	  COURTS	  45	  (2007).	  See	  also	  Gary	  
Lawson,	  Ordinary	   Powers	   in	   Extraordinary	   Times:	   Commons	   Sense	   in	   Times	   of	   Crisis,	   87	   B.	   U.	   L.	   REV.	   289,	   311	  
(2007). 
60	   Commentators	   such	   as	   Ackerman	   envisage	   a	   role	   for	   the	   legislature	   in	   determining	   the	   existence	   of	   an	  
emergency.	   However,	   these	   models	   often	   leave	   it	   to	   the	   executive	   to	   make	   the	   initial	   declaration,	   which	   is	  
subsequently	   scrutinized	   by	   the	   legislature.	   For	   Ackerman,	   each	   subsequent	   renewal	   of	   a	   declaration	   of	  
emergency	  would	  require	  an	  increasing	  majority.	  See	  Bruce	  Ackerman,	  The	  Emergency	  Constitution,	  113	  YALE	  L.J.	  
1029	  (2004). 
61	  See	  POSNER	  &	  VERMEULE,	  supra	  note	  59. 
62	  Id. 
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of	  discretion.63	  That	  conceded,	  there	  is	  considerable	  debate	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  decision	  to	  
declare	  a	  state	  of	  emergency	  is	  primarily	  a	  political	  one.64	  While	  the	  declaration	  of	  whether	  
a	   state	   of	   emergency	   exists	   or	   not	   has	   legal	   ramifications,	   there	   is	   no	   consensus,	   both	  
among	   different	   states	   and	   academics,	   as	   to	   the	   actual	   legal	   status	   of	   this	   issue.	   At	   the	  
most	  simplistic	  level,	  this	  debate	  has	  two	  sides—	  those	  who	  think	  it	  is	  a	  legal	  question,	  and	  
hence	   reviewable	   by	   the	   courts,	   and	   those	   who	   consider	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   state	   of	  
emergency	   is	   a	   purely	   political	   issue,	   removing	   all	   scope	   for	   judicial	   review	   of	   such	   a	  
declaration.65	   Carl	   Schmitt	  went	   so	   far	   as	   to	   base	   his	   definition	   of	   the	   sovereign	   on	   one	  
who	  has	   the	  power	   to	  declare	  a	   state	  of	  emergency	   (“[S]overeign	   is	  he	  who	  decides	   the	  
exception”);	   therefore,	   not	   only	   is	   this	   a	   political	   question,	   it	   is	   the	   defining	   political	  
question.66	   As	  with	  most	   things	   however,	   the	   application	   of	   these	   various	   approaches	   is	  
not	  as	  clear-­‐cut	  in	  practice.	  
	  
	  
C.	  Article	  15:	  	  Theory	  and	  Application	  
	  
Mirroring67	  the	  language	  used	  in	  Article	  4	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  International	  Covenant	  on	  
Civil	  and	  Political	  Rights	  (ICCPR),68	  Article	  15	  of	  the	  ECHR	  states	  the	  following:	  
	  
	  
In	   time	  of	  war	  or	  other	  public	  emergency	  threatening	  the	   life	  of	   the	  nation,	  any	  
High	  Contracting	  Party	  may	  take	  measures	  derogating	  from	  its	  obligations	  under	  
this	  convention	  to	  the	  extent	  strictly	  required	  by	  the	  exigencies	  of	  the	  situation.	  
	  
	  
Article	   15	   contains	   two	   principle	   limbs.69	   First,	   there	   must	   exist	   a	   “war	   or	   other	   public	  
                                            
63	   Fiona	  de	   Londras	  &	  Fergal	  Davis,	  Controlling	   the	  Executive	   in	   Times	  of	   Terrorism:	  Competing	  Perspectives	  on	  
Effective	  Oversight	  Mechanisms,	  30	  OXFORD	  JOURNAL	  OF	  LEGAL	  STUDIES	  19	  (2010). 
64	  See	  generally,	   Louis	  Henkin,	   Is	   there	  a	   "Political	  Question"	  Doctrine?,	   85	  YALE	   L.	   J.	   597	   (1976).	  See	  also	  DAVID	  
DYZENHAUS,	  supra	  note	  8,	  at	  18-­‐19. 
65	  See	  Henkin,	  id. 
66	  See	  CARL	  SCHMITT,	  supra	  note	  42,	  at	  5.	   
67	  Council	  of	  Europe,	  Preparatory	  Work	  on	  Article	  15	  of	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  5	  (1956).	  The	  
British	  submission	  that	  there	  should	  be	  a	  derogation	  clause	  was	  seen	  to	  be	  an	  almost	  “textual	  reproduction”	  of	  
Article	  4	  of	  the	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Civil	  and	  Political	  Rights,	  Dec.	  16,	  1966,	  999	  U.N.T.S.	  171	  [hereinafter	  
“ICCPR”]. 
68	  	  ICCPR,	  id. 
69	  Article	  15	  of	  the	  ECHR	  also	  recognizes	  that	  some	  rights,	  such	  as	  the	  right	  to	  life	  (article	  2)	  and	  the	  right	  to	  be	  
free	  from	  torture	  or	  cruel	  and	  inhumane	  punishment	  (article	  3)	  may	  not	  be	  deviated	  from,	  even	  during	  a	  state	  of	  
emergency.	  See	  ECHR,	  supra	  note	  1.	   
	  	   	   	  	  	  	  [Vol.	  12	  No.	  10 1776	   G e rman 	   L aw 	   J o u r n a l 	  
emergency	  threatening	  the	  life	  of	  the	  nation.”	  The	  ECHR	  therefore	  expressly	  concedes	  that	  
there	   are	   instances	   when	   the	   ordinary	   human	   rights	   obligations	   of	   states	   may	   not	   be	  
followed.	   This	   is	   recognition	   of	   the	   liberal	   democratic	   order’s	   inability	   to	   accommodate	  
every	  scenario	  presented	  to	  it.	  Originally,	  the	  drafters	  of	  the	  ECHR	  considered	  the	  general	  
limitation	  clause	  sufficient	   to	  deal	  with	  emergency	  conditions.70	  Such	  an	  approach	  would	  
have	   been	   a	   clear	   endorsement	   of	   the	   “business	   as	   usual”	   model.	   	   Article	   15	   was	   only	  
included	   primarily	   at	   the	   behest	   of	   the	   British	   government	   during	   the	   drafting	   of	   the	  
Convention.71	   Accordingly,	   the	   first	   limb	   of	   Article	   15	   appears	   to	   be	   a	   classical	  
representation	  of	  the	  emergency-­‐normalcy	  dichotomy.	  	  
	  
Article	  15	  does	  not	  afford	  a	  state	  carte	  blanche	  to	  deal	  with	  a	  threat	  as	  it	  sees	  fit,	  once	  a	  
state	   of	   emergency	   is	   declared.	   Rather	   the	   second	   limb	   of	   Article	   15	   requires	   that	   such	  
measures	   be	   “proportionate	   to	   the	   exigencies	   of	   the	   situation.”	   Thus,	   the	   ECtHR	   still	  
applies	  a	  proportionality	  test	  to	  the	  measures	  enacted	  to	  test	  their	  compatibility	  with	  the	  
ECHR.	  This	  second	  limb	  envisages	  a	  role	  for	  the	  ECtHR	  identical	  to	  that	  played	  by	  it	  during	  
normalcy.	   Despite	   the	   declaration	   of	   a	   state	   of	   emergency	   under	   Article	   15,	   it	   is	   still	  
“business	  as	  usual”	  as	  far	  as	  the	  ECtHR’s	  approach	  and	  role	  is	  concerned.	  Ideally,	  the	  two	  
limbs	  of	  Article	  15	  would	  act	   together	  as	  a	  “double-­‐lock”	  protection	  against	  unnecessary	  
human	  rights	  encroachments.	  	  
	  
	  
I.	  The	  Two	  Limbs	  of	  Article	  15	  in	  Practice	  
	  
The	  phrasing	  of	  “in	  time	  of	  war	  or	  other	  public	  emergency”	  reflects	  a	  belief	  that	  “war”	  or	  
“public	   emergency”	   constitute	   objective	   factual	   conditions	   capable	   of	   identification	   and	  
separation	   from	   the	   ordinary	   background	   of	   normalcy.	   An	   emergency	   would	   only	   be	  
declared	  when	   these	   conditions	   exist.	   Equally,	   an	   emergency	  would	   cease	   to	   exist	   once	  
these	   conditions	  have	  been	  extinguished	  and	  normalcy	  has	  been	   restored.	   These	   factual	  
conditions	   are	   however,	   framed	   in	   quite	   broad	   language.	   Thus,	   although	   war,	   as	  
understood	  by	  its	  every	  day	  meaning,	  would	  constitute	  a	  “core”	  instance	  of	  a	  phenomenon	  
triggering	   a	   state	   of	   emergency,	   the	   phrase	   “….or	   other	   public	   emergency”	   expands	   the	  
penumbra	  of	   “public	  emergency”	   to	  cover	  a	  potentially	   infinite	  array	  of	  crises	  within	   the	  
ambit	  of	  Article	  15.	  	  
	  
Lawless	  v	  Ireland72	  was	  the	  first	  case	  to	  assess	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  state	  of	  emergency	  under	  
Article	  15,	   and	   the	   first	   to	  be	  heard	  before	   the	  ECtHR,	  which,	   according	   to	  Dickson,	  was	  
                                            
70	  Joan	  Hartman,	  Derogation	  from	  Human	  Rights	  Treaties	  in	  Public	  Emergencies	  22	  HARV.	  IN’TL	  L.	  J.	  	  5	  (1981) 
71	  See	  Preparatory	  Work	  on	  Article	  15	  of	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights,	  supra	  note	  67.	   
72	  Lawless,	  supra	  note	  13. 
2011]	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arguably	  a	  significant	  factor	  in	  its	  unanimous	  decision.73	  Lawless	  was	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Irish	  
Republican	   Army	   (IRA),	   an	   illegal	   organization	   that	   was	   interned	   in	   Ireland	   under	   the	  
Offences	  against	  the	  State	  (Amendment)	  Act	  1940,	  the	  provisions	  of	  which	  were	  subject	  to	  
a	   derogation	   notice	   lodged	   with	   the	   ECHR	   in	   accordance	   with	   Article	   15.	   The	   ECtHR	  
therefore	  had	   two	   issues	   to	  decide.	   First,	  whether	   there	  existed	  a	   state	  of	  emergency	   in	  
Ireland	   as	   defined	   by	   Article	   15,	   and	   if	   so,	   whether	   the	   measures	   introduced	   were	  
proportionate	  to	  the	  exigencies	  of	  the	  situation.	  	  
	  
On	  the	  first	  issue,	  where	  the	  Commission	  was	  divided	  by	  a	  majority	  of	  nine	  to	  five	  in	  favor	  
of	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  state	  of	  emergency	  that	  threatened	  the	  life	  of	  the	  nation,	  the	  ECtHR	  
was	  unanimous.74	  The	  ECtHR	  held	  that	  the	  phrase	  “public	  emergency	  threatening	  the	   life	  
of	   the	   nation,”	   when	   given	   its	   natural	   and	   customary	   meaning,	   referred	   to	   “....	   [A]n	  
exceptional	   situation	   of	   crisis	   or	   emergency	   which	   affects	   the	   whole	   population	   and	  
constitutes	   a	   threat	   to	   the	   organized	   life	   of	   the	   community	   of	   which	   the	   state	   is	  
composed....”75	  These	  conditions	  were	  deemed	  to	  exist	  for	  three	  reasons:	  First,	  that	  there	  
was	   a	   secret	   army	   operating	   within	   the	   state	   engaged	   in	   unconstitutional	   activities;	  
second,	   that	   this	   same	   army	   was	   also	   operating	   beyond	   the	   state	   in	   Northern	   Ireland,	  
jeopardizing	  the	  relations	  between	   Ireland	  and	   its	  neighbor;	  and	  finally,	   that	   there	  was	  a	  
marked	  increase	  in	  terroristic	  activities	  from	  autumn	  1956	  to	  July	  1957.76	  
	  
The	   ECtHR’s	   rationale	   in	   Lawless	   has	   been	   subject	   to	   substantial	   criticism,77	   yet	   the	  
decision	  has	  never	  been	  over-­‐ruled,	  but	  rather,	  has	  been	  endorsed.78	  Gross	  and	  Ní	  Aoláin	  
argue	   that	   the	   factual	   conditions	   the	   ECtHR	   uses	   to	   corroborate	   its	   assertion	   of	   the	  
existence	  of	  a	  state	  of	  emergency	  stands	  vastly	  out	  of	   line	  with	   the	  natural	  and	  ordinary	  
meaning	  of	  the	  phrase	  “public	  emergency	  threatening	  the	  life	  of	  the	  nation.”79	  Gross	  and	  
                                            
73	  BRICE	  DICKSON,	  THE	  EUROPEAN	  CONVENTION	  ON	  HUMAN	  RIGHTS	  AND	  THE	  CONFLICT	  IN	  NORTHERN	  IRELAND	  37	  (2010). 
74	  Lawless,	  supra	  note	  13,	  at	  para.	  28 
75	  Id. 
76	  Id. 
77	  See	  for	  example,	  Gross,	  supra	  note	  17,	  at	  460-­‐464. 
78	  Ireland	  v	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  Judgment	  of	  18	  January	  1978,	  25	  Eur.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  (ser.	  A,	  1978). 
79	  The	  Siracusa	  Principles	  have	  attempted	  to	  shed	  some	  light	  on	  the	  equivalent	  phrase	  contained	   in	  Article	  4	  of	  
the	   ICCPR,	   declaring	   that	   in	   order	   for	   conditions	   to	   amount	   to	   a	   threat	   to	   the	   life	   of	   the	   nation,	   they	   must	  
constitute	  a	  situation	  of	  exceptional	  and	  actual	  or	  imminent	  danger.	  See	  The	  Siracusa	  Principles	  on	  the	  Limitation	  
and	  Derogation	  Provisions	  in	  the	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Civil	  and	  Political	  Rights	  7	  HUMAN	  RIGHTS	  QUARTERLY	  3,7	  
(1985).	  Similarly,	  the	  Paris	  Minimum	  Standards	  outline	  that	  “public	  emergency”	  means	  “an	  exceptional	  situation	  
of	  crisis	  or	  public	  danger,	  actual	  or	  imminent,	  which	  affects	  the	  whole	  population,	  or	  the	  whole	  population	  of	  the	  
area	  to	  which	  the	  declaration	  applies	  and	  constitutes	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  organized	  life	  of	  the	  community	  of	  which	  the	  
state	  is	  composed.”	  See	  Lillich,	  supra	  	  note	  25,	  at	  1073. 
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Ní	  Aoláin	  particularly	  criticize	  the	  notion	  that	  a	  state	  of	  emergency	  may	  be	  deduced,	  due	  to	  
the	  deterioration	  of	  foreign	  relations	  with	  another	  state.80	  
	  
Although	  not	  expressly	  mentioned	  in	  Lawless,	  Gross	  and	  Ní	  Aoláin	  argue	  that	  the	  language	  
used	   by	   the	   ECtHR	   shows	   that	   a	   state	   enjoys	   a	   certain	   margin	   of	   appreciation	   when	  
deciding	  whether	  an	  emergency	  exists	  or	  not.81	  The	  ECtHR	  therefore	  defers	  to	  the	  national	  
authorities,	  as	  these	  are	  considered	  best	  placed	  to	  assess	  whether	  an	  emergency	  exists	  or	  
not.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  ECtHR	  did	  expressly	  declare	  that	  it	  had	  jurisdiction	  to	  the	  existence	  
of	   an	   emergency.82	   The	   issue	   therefore,	   is	   a	   legal	   one.	   That	   conceded,	   the	   “margin	   of	  
appreciation	   doctrine”	   shows	   that	   the	   ECtHR	   recognizes	   that	   it	   is,	   nevertheless,	   a	   highly	  
politicized	   legal	   issue.83	   Thus,	   as	   Lawless	  was	   its	   first	   decision	   its	   legitimacy	   could	   have	  
been	   seriously	   threatened	   were	   it	   to	   undermine	   the	   decision	   of	   a	   sovereign	   state.84	  
Lawless	  presents	  the	   image	  of	  a	   judicially	  active	  court,	  declaring	   its	   jurisdiction	  to	  review	  
the	   decision	   of	   a	   sovereign	   state	   as	   to	   the	   existence	   of	   an	   emergency.	   In	   reality,	   this	   is	  
substantially	   tempered	   by	   the	   wide	   margin	   of	   appreciation	   afforded	   to	   a	   state	   when	  
assessing	  whether	   an	   emergency	   exists	   or	   not.	   	   Lawless	   therefore	   does	   not	   successfully	  
answer	   whether	   the	   issue	   of	   the	   existence	   of	   emergency	   is	   up	   to	   the	   legal	   or	   political	  
spheres	  to	  decide.	  Rather,	  we	  are	  presented	  with	  the	  view	  that	  a	  state	  of	  emergency	  is	  a	  
legal	   issue,	   but	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   judicial	   oversight	   and	   its	   deference	   to	   “national	  
authorities”	  on	  this	  issue	  means	  that	  the	  de	  facto	  existence	  of	  a	  state	  of	  emergency	  is	  left	  
to	  the	  political	  sphere.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  severity	  threshold	  in	  Lawless	  that	  a	  crisis	  must	  cross	  
in	   order	   to	   declare	   a	   state	   of	   emergency	   is	   set	   extremely	   low,	   potentially	   encompassing	  
mundane	  phenomena	  which	  do	  not	  threaten	  to	  usurp	  the	  state.	  Thus,	  despite	  appearing	  
to	   assess	   whether	   a	   state	   of	   emergency	   exists	   or	   not,	   the	   ECtHR’s	   approach	   in	   Lawless	  
renders	  the	  first	   limb	  of	  Article	  15	  redundant,	  as	  serious	  scrutiny	  of	  whether	  such	  a	  state	  
exists	  is	  not	  undertaken.	  	  
	  
Instead,	  Lawless	  results	  in	  the	  ECtHR	  focusing	  on	  the	  second	  limb:	  whether	  the	  measures	  
enacted	   were	   proportionate	   to	   the	   exigencies	   of	   the	   situation.	   As	   this	   is	   effectively	   the	  
application	   of	   a	   proportionality	   test—	   the	   same	   methodology	   employed	   by	   the	   ECtHR	  
when	  assessing	  alleged	  encroachments	  on	  human	   rights—	   it	  would	  appear	   that	   the	  only	  
redress	  an	  individual	  may	  have	  in	  succeeding	  under	  Article	  15	  is	  to	  show	  that	  the	  measures	  
                                            
80	  See	  GROSS	  &	  NÍ	  AOLÁIN,	  supra	  note	  10,	  at	  271. 
81	   Oren	   Gross	   &Fionnuala	   Ní	   Aoláin,	   From	   Discretion	   to	   Scrutiny:	   Revisiting	   the	   Application	   of	   the	   Margin	   of	  
Appreciation	  Doctrine	  in	  the	  Context	  of	  Article	  15	  of	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights,	  3	  HUMAN	  RIGHTS	  
QUARTERLY	  623,	  631-­‐634	  (2001).	  The	  “margin	  of	  appreciation”	  doctrine	  was	  subsequently	  expressly	  referred	  to	  in	  
Ireland	  v.	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  supra	  note	  78. 
82	  See	  Dickson,	  supra	  note	  73,	  at	  37. 
83	  	  See	  GROSS	  &	  NÍ	  AOLÁIN,	  supra	  note	  81. 
84	  See	  Dickson,	  supra	  note	  73,	  at	  37. 
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are	  not	  proportionate,	  i.e.	  a	  “business	  as	  usual”	  approach.	  Nevertheless,	  in	  Lawless,	  Ireland	  
was	  found	  to	  have	  satisfied	  both	  limbs	  of	  Article	  15;	  a	  state	  of	  emergency	  did	  exist	  and	  the	  
measures	   were	   proportionate	   to	   the	   exigencies	   of	   the	   situation.	   Accordingly,	   the	  
dominance	  of	   the	   second	   limb	  of	  Article	   15	   is	   not	   clear-­‐cut	   from	   the	  analysis	   of	  Lawless	  
alone.	  The	  subsequent	  Belmarsh	  Case	   is	  a	  further	  example	  of	  when	  a	  state	  of	  emergency	  
was	  deemed	  to	  exist,	  but	  the	  measures	  enacted	  were	  not	  proportionate	  to	  the	  exigencies	  
of	  the	  situation.	  
	  
	  
II.	  The	  Belmarsh	  Case	  
	  
The	   “margin	   of	   appreciation	   doctrine”	   was	   utilized	   in	   Belmarsh	   both	   by	   the	   House	   of	  
Lords85	  and	  the	  ECtHR,	  86	  when	  asked	  to	  rule	  on	  whether	  a	  state	  of	  emergency	  existed	  in	  
the	  United	  Kingdom	  (UK)	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  attacks	  on	  the	  US	  on	  11	  September	  2001.	  
In	   Belmarsh,	   the	   ECtHR	   declared	   that	   “the	   national	   authorities	   are,	   in	   principle,	   better	  
placed	  than	  the	  international	  judge	  to	  decide	  ….	  on	  the	  presence	  of	  such	  an	  emergency.”87	  
Accordingly,	  a	  wide	  margin	  of	  appreciation	  should	  be	   left	  to	  the	  national	  authorities.	  The	  
declaration	  of	  a	  state	  of	  emergency	  by	  the	  UK	  was	  therefore	  not	  challenged,	  despite	  the	  
fact	   that	   it	   was	   the	   only	   Council	   of	   the	   European	   Union	   Member	   State	   to	   lodge	   a	  
derogation	  notice	  under	  Article	  15	  of	  the	  ECHR,	  even	  though	  it	  was	  not	  the	  only	  country	  at	  
risk	  of	  a	  terrorist	  attack.	  Indeed,	  Spain,	  which	  suffered	  a	  significant	  terrorist	  attack	  in	  2003,	  
did	  not	  declare	  a	  state	  of	  emergency	  in	  accordance	  with	  Article	  15	  of	  the	  ECHR.	  The	  ECtHR	  
relied	  on	  the	  finding	  in	  Lawless	  that	  a	  terrorist	  attack	  could	  constitute	  an	  emergency	  and	  
hence,	   an	   emergency	   could	   reasonably	   be	   inferred	   to	   exist.	   Such	   reasoning	   however,	  
completely	   avoids	   any	   engagement	   with	   the	   concept	   of	   terrorism,	   a	   phenomenon	   that	  
avoids	   a	   universal	   definition.88	   Like	   “emergency,”	   “terrorism”	   is	   an	   umbrella	   term	  
encompassing	  disparate	  groups,	  goals	  and	  methods.	  A	  so-­‐labeled	   terrorist	  attack	  may	  be	  
devastating,	  on	   the	  scale	  of	  11	  September	  2001,	  or	  substantially	   less	  destructive,	  akin	   to	  
more	  mundane	   criminal	   activity.	   To	   broadly	   infer	   that	   all	   terrorist	   threats	   constitute	   an	  
emergency	   is	   spurious.	   Terrorism	   therefore	   is	   a	   phenomenon	   that	   lies	   under	   the	  
“penumbra”	   of	   emergency,	   where	   the	   extremes	   of	   “magnitude”	   and	   “urgency”	   can	   be	  
used	  to	  distinguish	  between	  the	  various	  events	  labeled	  as	  terrorist	  activity.89	  
	  
                                            
85	  See	  Belmarsh,	  supra	  note	  12.	   
86	  Id. 
87	  Id.	  at	  para.	  173. 
88	  See	  Friedrichs,	  supra	  note	  35. 
89	  Id.	  at	  88. 
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The	  House	  of	   Lords	  echoed	   the	   same	  sentiments	  as	   the	  ECtHR,	  by	   stating	   that	   terrorism	  
can	  constitute	  an	  emergency.	  Lord	  Hoffmann	  however,	  argued	  that	  a	  state	  of	  emergency	  
did	  not	  exist	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  11	  September	  2001,	  as	  no	  threat	  to	  the	  “life	  of	  the	  nation”	  
was	  posed	  by	  Al	  Qaeda,90	  instead	  comparing	  it	  to	  the	  Spanish	  Armada	  or	  Nazi	  Germany.91	  
The	  latter	  two	  threatened	  the	  life	  of	  the	  nation	  not	  because	  of	  the	  loss	  of	  life	  their	  actions	  
would	   entail,	   but	   because	   they	   would	   overthrow	   British	   rule	   and	   make	   its	   institutions	  
subject	  to	  the	  rule	  of	  others.	  The	  very	  existence	  of	  the	  nation	  was	  threatened	  in	  such	  an	  
instance.	  Al	  Qaeda,	  in	  contrast,	  did	  not	  pose	  such	  a	  threat.	  
	  
Lord	  Hoffmann	  did	  however	  concede	  that	  the	  IRA	  posed	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  life	  of	  the	  nation,	  
as	  it	  was	  an	  organization	  dedicated	  and	  to	  the	  potential	  to	  threaten	  the	  territorial	  integrity	  
of	   the	   UK.92	   However,	   this	   is	   not	   an	   endorsement	   of	   the	   ruling	   of	   Lawless,	   as	   that	   case	  
referred	  to	  a	  state	  of	  emergency	   in	  the	  Republic	  of	   Ireland,	  not	  the	  UK.	  Lord	  Hoffmann’s	  
reasoning	  on	  what	  constitutes	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  life	  of	  the	  nation	  separates	  the	  existence	  of	  
the	   state	   from	   the	   life	   of	   its	   citizens.	   The	   state	   is	   a	   metaphysical	   institution	   that	   is	  
independent	  from	  the	  lives	  of	  its	  citizens,;	  hence	  its	  ability	  to	  survive	  over	  generations.	  The	  
Attorney	   General’s	   (AG)	   submissions93	   therefore,	   of	   Al	   Qaeda’s	   ability	   to	   cause	   severe	  
destruction	   of	   life	   and	   property	   does	   not	   necessarily	   entail	   a	   threat	   to	   the	   “life	   of	   the	  
nation.”	  	  Lord	  Hoffmann’s	  judgment	  concludes	  by	  warning	  that	  
	  
	  
[T]he	  real	  threat	  to	  the	  life	  of	  the	  nation....comes	  not	  from	  terrorism,	  but	  from	  l
	  laws	  such	  as	  these.	  They	  are	  the	  true	  measure	  of	  what	  terrorism	  may	  achieve.	  It	  is	  
for	  Parliament	  to	  decide	  whether	  to	  give	  the	  terrorists	  such	  a	  victory.94	  
	  
	  
Instead,	   the	  decisions	  of	  both	  the	  House	  of	  Lords	  and	  the	  ECtHR	   in	  Belmarsh	   focused	  on	  
the	   second	   limb	   of	   Article	   15—	   on	   whether	   the	   measures	   were	   proportionate	   to	   the	  
exigencies	   of	   the	   situation.	   Following	   the	   same	   reasoning	   as	   the	   Special	   Immigration	  
Appeals	   Commission,	   the	  majority	   of	   the	   House	   of	   Lords	   (9:6)	   found	   that	   the	  measures	  
enacted	   by	   the	   British	   Government	   were	   disproportionate	   and	   discriminatory,	   as	   they	  
differentiated	  arbitrarily	  between	  non-­‐nationals	  suspected	  of	   international	  terrorism,	  and	  
UK	  citizens	  who	  were	  considered	   to	  present	   the	  same	  threat	  qualitatively.95	   Lord	  Walker	  
                                            
90	  See	  Belmarsh,	  supra	  note	  12,	  at	  	  para.	  96. 
91	  Id.	  at	  134. 
92	  See	  Belmarsh,	  supra	  note	  12,	  at	  para.	  96. 
93	  See	  per	  Lord	  Bingham’s	  summary	  in	  the	  House	  of	  Lords,	  supra	  note	  12,	  at	  110. 
94	  Id. 
95	  See	  Belmarsh,	  supra	  note	  12,	  at	  paras.	  96-­‐97.	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dissented,	  as	  he	  endorsed	  the	  position	  of	  the	  UK	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  and	  the	  AG’s	  submission	  
that	  on	  matters	  of	  national	  security,	  courts	  should	  defer	  to	  the	  executive	  and	  legislature,	  
as	   these	   were	   questions	   of	   a	   political	   nature.96	   	   The	   ECtHR	   took	   an	   almost-­‐identical	  
position	   to	   the	   majority,	   focusing	   little	   attention	   on	   whether	   an	   emergency	   existed,	  
concentrating	   instead	   on	   whether	   the	   measures	   enacted	   were	   proportionate	   to	   the	  
exigencies	   of	   the	   situation.	   However,	   the	   ECtHR	   differed	   from	   the	   House	   of	   Lords	   in	  
respect	   of	   who	   constitute	   the	   “national	   authorities”	   capable	   of	   declaring	   a	   state	   of	  
emergency.97	   The	   ECtHR	   considered	   the	   House	   of	   Lords	   as	   competent	   to	   review	   the	  
decision	  of	  declaring	  emergency,	  and	  as	   the	   latter	  was	   satisfied	   that	   the	  executive	  acted	  
legitimately,	  so	  too	  was	  the	  ECtHR.	  This	  however,	  was	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  House	  of	  
Lords,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  Lord	  Hoffmann’s	  minority	   judgment,	  proffered	   little	  scrutiny	  
of	   the	   decision	   to	   declare	   a	   state	   of	   emergency,	   but	   also	   deferred	   to	   the	   executive’s	  
assessment	  of	  the	  situation.98	  Belmarsh	  presents	  both	  the	  ECtHR	  and	  the	  House	  of	  Lords	  as	  
focusing	  only	  on	  whether	  the	  measures	  enacted	  are	  proportionate	  to	  the	  exigencies	  of	  the	  
situation.	  Such	   is	   the	   foreseeable	  consequence	  of	  Lawless,	  which	  sets	   the	   threat	  severity	  
threshold	  very	  low,	  and	  defers	  to	  the	  national	  authorities	  regarding	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  state	  




D.	  The	  Jurisprudence	  of	  the	  ECHR:	  	  A	  Permanent	  Emergency?	  
	  
Derogation	   clauses	   can	   be	   used	   as	   both	   a	   sword	   and	   a	   shield.	   It	   is	   in	   their	   role	   as	   the	  
former—	  protection	  of	  human	  rights	  and	  of	  the	  system	  of	  normalcy—	  that	  the	  delineation	  
of	  an	  emergency	  as	  a	  “threat	  to	  the	  life	  of	  the	  nation”	  becomes	  paramount.	  The	  approach	  
of	   the	   ECtHR	   and	   the	   House	   of	   Lords	   in	   Belmarsh	   essentially	   ignores	   the	   issue	   of	   the	  
existence	  of	  a	  state	  of	  emergency.	  Lord	  Walker	  defends	  this	  approach,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  
severity	  threshold	  a	  threat	  must	  meet	   in	  order	  to	  qualify	  as	  an	  emergency	  should	  not	  be	  
set	  too	  high,	  given	  the	  requirement	  that	  the	  response	  be	  proportionate	  to	  the	  exigencies	  
of	   the	   situation.	   That	   is,	   one	   need	   not	   worry	   about	   the	   first	   limb	   of	   Article	   15,	   as	   the	  
second	   limb	   is	   there	   to	   protect	   human	   rights.	   This	   shielding	   effect	   of	   the	   state	   of	  
emergency	  is	  weakened	  further,	  albeit	  from	  an	  already	  diminished	  position,	  given	  the	  low	  
threat	   severity	   threshold	   and	   the	   wide	   margin	   of	   appreciation	   afforded	   to	   national	  
authorities	  in	  Lawless.	  Michael	  O’	  Boyle’s	  assertion	  that	  the	  Strasbourg	  Machinery	  provides	  
“an	   outer	   bulwark	   of	   defense	   against	   arbitrary	   or	   panicky	   invocation	   of	   emergency	  
                                            
96	  See	  Belmarsh,	  supra	  note	  12,	  at	  para.	  209.	   
97	  See	  DYZENHAUS,	  supra	  note	  8,	  at	  179. 
98	  Id. 
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powers”	   is	   therefore	   unrealized.99	   By	   deferring	   to	   national	   authorities,	   namely	   the	  
executive,	  on	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  state	  of	  emergency,	   the	  phrase	  “threat	  to	  the	   life	  of	  the	  
nation”	   is	   stretched	   to	   the	   point	   whereby	   it	   becomes	   useless	   in	   controlling	   a	   state’s	  
actions.	  To	  date,	   there	   is	  only	  one	  example,	  The	  Greek	  Case,100	   in	  which	  a	  declaration	  of	  
emergency	  was	   rejected	  by	   the	  Commission	   (the	   case	   never	  made	   it	   before	   the	   ECtHR).	  
However,	  Gross	  and	  Ní	  Aoláin	  argue	  that	  this	  decision	  has	  more	  to	  do	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  
was	  an	  anti-­‐democratic	  regime	  that	  declared	  the	  state	  of	  emergency	  in	  Greece,	  rather	  than	  
an	   objective	   analysis	   of	   whether	   or	   not	   a	   serious	   threat	   was	   posed	   to	   the	   state	   by	  
communist	  insurgents.101	  	  
	  
The	  ECtHR	  in	  Belmarsh	  further	  damages	  this	  shielding	  effect	  by	  eliminating	  the	  exceptional	  
nature	  that	  phenomena	  must	  constitute	  to	  trigger	  a	  state	  of	  emergency,	  by	  declaring	  that	  
emergency	   under	   Article	   15	   does	   not	   necessarily	   have	   to	   be	   temporary.102	   Instead,	  
“duration”	   becomes	   merely	   another	   factor	   in	   determining	   whether	   the	   measures	  
undertaken	  were	   proportionate	   to	   the	   exigencies	   of	   the	   situation.103	   This	   fundamentally	  
uproots	  Article	  15	  as	  a	  representation	  of	  the	  normalcy-­‐emergency	  dichotomy,	  as	  the	  goal	  
of	  restoring	  the	  latter	  is	  abandoned	  by	  the	  ECtHR.	  Article	  15	  may	  no	  longer	  be	  described	  as	  
a	  shield,	  protecting	  against	  encroachments	  on	  human	  rights,	  as	  normalcy	  and	  emergency	  
are	   not	   mutually	   exclusive	   states.	   Rather,	   they	   are	   posited	   in	   an	   inversely	   proportional	  
relationship	  to	  each	  other	  by	  dominance	  of	  the	  “business	  as	  usual”	  limb	  of	  Article	  15.	  Thus,	  
the	   status	   quo	   fluctuates	   between	   varying	   degrees	   of	   “normalcy”	   and	   “emergency.”	  
Sometimes	   it	   may	   be	   more	   akin	   to	   “normalcy”	   than	   “emergency”,	   in	   which	   case	   the	  
exigencies	   of	   the	   situation	   would	   not	   permit	   serious	   encroachments	   on	   human	   rights.	  
Conversely,	  when	  the	  situation	  is	  “less	  normal”	  i.e.	  more	  emergency-­‐like,	  more	  draconian	  
measures	   may	   be	   permitted.	   The	   result	   is	   that	   Article	   15	   has	   been	   interpreted	   to	  
corroborate	  more	  accurately	  to	  a	  view	  that	  states	  of	  emergency	  are	  merely	  another	  factor	  
restricting	  the	  absolutist	  claims	  of	  certain	  human	  rights.	  Much	  as	  the	  right	  to	  free	  speech	  is	  
limited	  by	  another	  person’s	  right	  to	  his	  or	  her	  good	  name,	  so	  too	  must	  the	  right	  to	  liberty,	  
privacy	  and	  other	   rights	   that	  may	  be	  derogated	   from	  during	  an	  emergency	  be	   limited	  by	  
another	   person’s	   right	   to	   security.104	   Accordingly,	   Article	   15’s	   singular	   role	   as	   a	   “sword”	  
remains.	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The	   requirement	   that	   an	   emergency	   must	   be	   declared	   under	   Article	   15	   may,	   to	   some	  
extent,	  shield	  human	  rights,	  as	  the	  jurisprudence	  of	  Article	  15	  is	  easily	  distinguished	  from	  
that	   of	   normalcy.	   The	   “creeping	   effect”105	   or	   “normalization	   of	   the	   exception”	   is	   thus	  
mitigated.	   However,	   the	   low	   threat	   severity	   threshold	   a	   crisis	   must	   cross	   in	   order	   to	  
constitute	  an	  emergency,	   coupled	  with	  a	   lack	  of	  due	   scrutiny	  of	   this	  decision	  makes	   this	  
differentiation	   merely	   formalistic.	   In	   Brannigan	   and	   McBride,106	   the	   ECtHR	   upheld	   the	  
detention	  of	  the	  petitioners	  under	  the	  Prevention	  of	  Terrorism	  (Temporary	  Provisions)	  Act	  
1984,	  as	  there	  was	  no	  breach	  of	  their	  right	  to	  liberty	  under	  article	  5	  of	  the	  ECHR,	  owing	  to	  
the	  declaration	  of	  emergency	  by	  the	  UK	  in	  accordance	  with	  Article	  15.	  This	  is	  in	  spite	  of	  an	  
earlier	   decision	   in	  Brogan	  and	  Others	   v.	   the	  United	   Kingdom,107	   an	   almost	   identical	   case	  
factually.	  Here,	   it	  was	   held	   that	   the	   petitioners’	   rights	  were	   infringed,	   as	   at	   the	   time	  no	  
derogation	   order	   had	   been	   lodged	  with	   the	   ECHR.	   The	   declaration	   of	   emergency	   before	  
Brannigan	   therefore	   seems	   primarily	  motivated	   by	   the	   decision	   in	  Brogan.108	   One	   could	  
argue	  that	  Article	  15	  does	  insist	  on	  a	  strict	  separation	  between	  normalcy	  and	  emergency,	  
and	   Brogan	   and	   Brannigan	   illustrate	   the	   legal	   differentiation	   between	   them.	   This	   is	  
however	   not	   grounded	   by	   a	   factual	   distinction	   between	   the	   two.	   Instead,	   owing	   to	   the	  
motivation	   behind	   the	   declaration	   of	   a	   state	   of	   emergency	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   Brogan	  
(rather	  than	  two	  separate	  legal	  regimes	  being	  created),	  the	  first	  limb	  of	  Article	  15	  operates	  
merely	  as	  a	  procedural	  barrier	  for	  a	  state.	  It	  is	  nothing	  more	  than	  administrative	  protocol	  
which	  must	  be	  followed,	  than	  a	  clear	  demarcating	  line	  between	  normalcy	  and	  emergency.	  	  
	  
Once	  this	  formal	  barrier	  is	  crossed,	  the	  only	  mechanism	  to	  temper	  a	  state’s	  actions	  under	  
Article	  15	   is	   the	  proportionality	   test	  of	   the	   second	   limb—	  that	   the	  measures	  enacted	  be	  
proportionate	  to	  the	  exigencies	  of	  the	  situation.	  This	  is	  indistinguishable	  from	  the	  ECtHR’s	  
methodology	  in	  non	  Article	  15	  cases.109	   	   In	  effect,	  the	  ECtHR	  acts	  in	  a	  “business	  as	  usual”	  
manner.	   However,	   this	   proportionality	   test	   is	   subject	   to	   a	   wide	  margin	   of	   appreciation,	  
resulting	  in	  a	  substantial	   level	  of	  deference	  to	  national	  authorities	  in	  much	  the	  same	  way	  
as	  the	  US	  Supreme	  Court	  has	  deferred	  to	  the	  executive	   in	  periods	  of	  emergency,	  despite	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Describing	   the	   two	   limbs	   of	   Article	   15	   as	   two	   barriers	   protecting	   human	   rights	   is	  
inaccurate.	   The	   requirement	   that	   a	   state	   of	   emergency	  must	   exist	   in	   order	   to	   derogate	  
from	  treaty	  obligations	  does	  little	  to	  protect	  human	  rights.	  Ideally,	  it	  should	  create	  a	  clear	  
demarcation	   between	   normalcy	   and	   emergency,	   allowing	   the	   latter	   to	   be	   declared	   only	  
when	   there	   is	   a	   situation	   “threatening	   the	   life	   of	   the	   nation.”	   The	   exception	   should	   be	  
contained	   firmly	   within	   these	   lines	   of	   demarcation,	   protecting	   human	   rights	   when	  
conditions	   of	   normalcy	   prevail.	   Instead,	   the	   requirement	   that	   a	   state	   of	   emergency	   be	  
declared	  is	   little	  more	  than	  an	  administrative	  procedure,	  facilitating	  the	  encroachment	  of	  
human	   rights,	   rather	   than	   containing	   them.	   Focus	   on	   whether	   the	   measures	   are	  
proportionate	  to	  the	  exigencies	  of	  the	  situation	  blurs	  these	  lines	  of	  demarcation	  between	  
normalcy	  and	  emergency	  further.	  
	  
The	  normalizing	  of	   the	  exception	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  permanent	  state	  of	  emergency	   is	  
not	   driven	   merely	   by	   factual	   conditions.110	   Deference	   to	   the	   executive’s	   assessment	   of	  
these	   factual	   conditions	   and	   the	   existence	   of	   an	   emergency	   is	   a	   major	   contributor	   to	  
perpetuated	   emergencies,	   given	   the	   propensity	   of	   a	   state	   to	   over-­‐estimate	   its	   security	  
needs	  in	  a	  time	  of	  crisis.111	  This	  article	  seeks	  to	  present	  a	  case	  for	  a	  less	  deferential	  role	  of	  
the	  judiciary	  in	  assessing	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  emergency.	  This	  could	  be	  done	  by	  the	  ECtHR	  
giving	  effect	  to	  the	  “natural	  and	  ordinary	  meaning”	  of	  the	  phrase	  “….threatening	  the	  life	  of	  
the	  nation,”	  i.e.	  an	  approach	  following	  the	  same	  scrutiny	  and	  reasoning	  employed	  by	  Lord	  
Hoffmann	  in	  Belmarsh.	   It	   is	   impossible	  and	  counter-­‐intuitive	  to	  define	  or	   list	  exhaustively	  
the	   phenomena	   that	   may	   give	   rise	   to	   a	   state	   of	   emergency	   in	   a	   concrete	   and	   juridical	  
manner.	  However,	  that	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  one	  cannot	  always	  clearly	  differentiate	  between	  
normalcy	   and	   emergency.	   It	   is	   around	   the	   penumbra	   of	   settled	   meaning,	   particularly	  
regarding	  threats	  labeled	  as	  “terrorist”	  where	  problems	  of	  identification	  arise.112	  Focusing	  
only	  on	  whether	  the	  measures	  are	  proportionate	  to	  the	  exigencies	  of	  the	  situation	   is	  not	  
sufficient,	   and	   only	   serves	   to	   further	   blur	   the	   distinction	   between	   normalcy	   and	  
emergency.	   The	   emergency	   paradigm	   is	   thus	   not	   obsolete.	  Only	   by	   realizing	   Article	   15’s	  
potential	  to	  act	  not	  only	  as	  a	  sword	  for	  derogating	  from	  human	  rights,	  but	  also	  as	  a	  shield	  
for	  protecting	  them,	  can	  one	  vindicate	  human	  rights.	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This	   paper	   recognizes	   instances	   where	   human	   rights	   and	   other	   liberal	   democratic	  
obligations	  may	  not	  be	  met.	   It	  does	  so	  due	  to	  the	  fundamental	   flaws	  of	   the	  “business	  as	  
usual”	  approach.	  However,	  while	  recognition	  of	  the	  need	  for	  a	  suspension	  of	  liberalism	  is	  a	  
paradox,	   it	   is	   not,	   as	   Schmitt	   argues,	   a	   fatal	   paradox.113	   Paradoxes	   should	   not	   exist.	  
However,	  the	  paradox	  can	  itself	  ensure	  this	  by	  collapsing	  in	  on	  itself.114	  Once	  the	  threat	  is	  
defeated,	  the	  need	  for	  such	  measures	  also	  disappears.	  States	  of	  emergency	  are	  therefore,	  
self-­‐destructive	   when	   properly	   deployed.	   The	   ECtHR	   must	   ensure	   this	   by	   effectively	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